MONETARY POLICY AND REAL INTEREST RATES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE MONEY STOCK ANNOUNCEMENTS This paper presents new evidence on how asset p r i c e s respond t o new information about the money stock. It shows t h a t the information content o f money stock announcements and t h e response of asset p r i c e s t o new i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e announcements vary w i t h changes i n the monetary p o l i c y regime, the
Federal Reserve o p e r a t i ng procedures, and t h e reserve accounti ng r u l e s . Whi 1 e previous studies have examined how asset p r i c e s respond t o t h e money stock announcements under the i n t e r e s t -r a t e t a r g e t i n g procedure and t h e nonborrowed reserve procedure, we have i ncl uded new evidence from t h e borrowed reserve t a r g e t i n g procedure under both 1 agged and contemporaneous reserve accounting r u l e s . Looking a t how both forward exchange r a t e s and o t h e r asset p r i c e s respond t o the announcements, we d i s t i n g u i s h between periods when the asset-price response r e f l e c t e d a change i n the r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e and those when i t r e f l e c t e d a change i n t h e i n f l a t i o n premium. F i n a l l y , we show t h a t t h e new contemporaneous reserve accounting r u l e s have g r e a t l y reduced the i n f o r m a t i o n content o f the money stock announcements.
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The e x p l i c i t examination o f expectations has been a r e c e n t important development i n economic theory and p o l i c y . Studies have emphasized the importance o f t h e market's perception o f and r e a c t i o n t o new i n f o r m a t i o n about economic p o l i c y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n the area o f monetary economics, one o f t h e ongoing debates has been over whether monetary p o l i c y can a f f e c t long-term r e a l i n t e r e s t rates. The r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s debate depends, t o a l a r g e extent, on how markets respond t o perceived changes i n monetary pol i c y . While
there have been many t h e o r e t i c a l and empirical s t u d i e s o f t h i s issue, t h e most recent examination can be found i n several papers t h a t i n v e s t i g a t e t h e response o f asset p r i c e s t o weekly money stock announcements. 1
The announcement s t u d i e s are based on t h e e f f i c i e n t market hypothesis, which s t a t e s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t asset p r i c e w i l l r e f l e c t a l l p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e information. Changes i n p r i c e s should r e f 1 e c t o n l y new information. The empirical model used i n s t u d i e s o f money stock announcements takes the f o l l o w i n g form:
where hAit = change i n the ith asset p r i c e from before t h e announcement t o a f t e r the announcement, UMt = s u r p r i s e i n t h e money stock announcement a t time t, EMt = expected change i n the money stock a t time t, and e = random e r r o r .
I f t h e e f f i c i e n t market hypothesis i s true, i f we have accurate measures o f expectations, and i f t h e money stock i s an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n determining t h e p r i c e o f the asset, then al w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t and ap w i l l be zero.
A r e s u l t common t o a l l of these announcement s t u d i e s i s t h a t estimates o f al are p o s i t i v e when i n t e r e s t r a t e s a r e used as t h e dependent v a r i a b l e i n equation 1. Several hypotheses have been presented t o e x p l a i n t h i s p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between money stock surprises and changes i n i n t e r e s t rates.
These hypotheses can be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two broad categories. The f i r s t a t t r i b u t e s the p o s i t i v e value o f al t o an i n f l a t i o n premium t h a t changes because t h e money stock s u r p r i s e i s t r e a t e d as a money supply shock. The second a t t r i b u t e s the p o s i t i v e value o f al t o a p o l i c y a n t i c i p a t i o n e f f e c t . The money stock s u r p r i s e i s t r e a t e d as a money demand shock t h a t i s expected t o be o f f s e t by f u t u r e p o l i c y actions.
I n t h i s paper we provide new evidence t o e x p l a i n how asset p r i c e s have responded t o s u r p r i s e s i n t h e money stock announcement over t h e past seven years. Our sample period, September 1977 t o September 1984, was determined by the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f survey data on the expected change i n t h e money stock.
The p e r i o d includes important changes i n monetary p o l i c y and operating procedures. W e d i s t i n g u i s h between p o l i c y regime changes and operating
procedure changes, which are n o t necessarily t h e same. The two may be t h e same i f the c e n t r a l bank i s o v e r l y concerned about short-run money market c o n d i t i o n s o r i f t h e short-run operating procedure i s n o t constrained by some long-run objectives.' W e d e f i n e a p o l i c y regime change as a change i n t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f the pol i c y a u t h o r i t y . I f t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s a weighted average o f d i f f e r e n t goals, then the p o l i c y change may be a s h i f t i n the re1 a t i v e weights f o r the d i f f e r e n t goals. Changes i n operating procedures may lead t o changes i n the response o f short-term asset p r i c e s t o the money stock announcements, b u t the response should be short-lived i f there i s no change i n the objective function. In t h i s case, there i s not likely t o be a response by 1 ong-term asset prices.
In October 1979 there was an apparent change in both the monetary policy regime and the short-run operating procedure. Reserve has maintained a disinflationary pol icy despite i t s returning t o an interest-rate smoothing procedure.
There was also an institutional change that should have an e f f e c t on how asset prices respond t o the money stock announcements. On February 2, 1984, the Federal Reserve switched reserve accounting rules; the lagged reserve accounting rul es ( L R R ) t h a t prevai 1 ed before February 2, 1984, were rep1 aced by a1 most contemporaneous reserve accounting rules ( C R R ) . W e expl ai n how the change i n rules has greatly reduced the information content of the money stock announcements.
In the l i t e r a t u r e review we show t h a t existing hypotheses are inadequate t o explain the pattern of results t h a t has emerged from past empirical studies. In t h i s paper we add a new market, the forward exchange rate, and a p e r i o d o f new evidence from y e t another change i n o p e r a t i n g procedures. This new evidence lends support t o t h e f o l l o w i n g conc1usions: F i r s t , t h e s t r e n g t h o f the r e a c t i o n o f the federal funds r a t e and o t h e r short-term i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o t h e money stock announcements depends on t h e p r e v a i l i n g operating procedure and t h e reserve accounting r u l e s .
Second, i n the pre-October 1979 p e r i o d o f an i n f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y , money stock s u r p r i s e s contained i n f o r m a t i o n about f u t u r e i n f l a t i o n rates. I n t e r e s t r a t e s and exchange r a t e s reacted t o the money stock surprises, because p r i v a t e agents r e v i s e d t h e i r i n f l a t i o n a r y expectations upward. Under 1 agged reserve requi rements, surprises i n b11 r e f l e c t e d money demand shocks. The Federal
Reserve a u t o m a t i c a l l y accommodated these shocks i n t h e s h o r t run. Over t h e l o n g run, p o l i c y allowed an upward d r i f t o f the monetary targets. This behavior l e d the market t o b e l i e v e t h a t money stock innovations would e v e n t u a l l y l e a d t o an upward r e v i s i o n o f money t a r g e t s and, consequently, h i g h e r i n f l a t i o n .
Third, i n the post-October 1979 period, the Federal Reserve's monetary p o l i c y changed t o one o f d i s i n f l a t i o n . The r a p i d deceleration o f i n f l a t i o n e a r l y i n t h i s p e r i o d has been f o l l o w e d by 1 ow and r e l a t i v e l y unchanged i n f l a t i o n r a t e s i n the l a s t two years. I n t h i s period, the r e a c t i o n o f nominal i n t e r e s t r a t e s and t h e d o l l a r exchange r a t e s t o money stock surprises r e f l e c t e d changes i n the market's assessment o f c u r r e n t and f u t u r e r e a l i n t e r e s t rates. This assessment r e s u l t e d from t h e perception t h a t t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s would n o t f u l l y accommodate t h e unusual and p e r s i s t e n t money demand shocks t h a t occurred d u r i n g t h i s period. These money demand shocks o r i g i n a t e d i n p o r t f o l i o disturbances associated w i t h t h e r a p i d decrease i n i n f l a t i o n , f i n a n c i a l innovations, and deregulation.
W e have organized t h e paper as f o l l o w s : Section I 1 c o n t a i n s a discussion o f the i n f o r m a t i o n content o f money stock announcements and a c r i t i c a l review o f major hypotheses, i n c l u d i n g recent f i n d i n g s from t h e f o r e i g n exchange market. Section I 1 1 sets o u t our hypotheses e x p l a i n i n g how asset pt-ices r e a c t t o money stock announcements under a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y regimes and operating procedures. Section I V i n c l udes empirical evidence about t h e response o f short-term i n t e r e s t rates, long-term i n t e r e s t rates, forward i n t e r e s t rates, spot exchange rates, and forward exchange r a t e s t o money stock surprises i n f o u r separate sub-periods between September 1977 and September 1984. This s e c t i o n a1 so i n c l udes concluding comments.
The Issues Surrounding the E f f e c t s o f Money Stock Announcements The Information Content o f Weekly Announcements
A common e r r o r i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on the e f f e c t o f money stock announcements i s the reference t o them as a supply e f f e c t . Nichols, Small, and Webster (1 983) c o r r e c t l y p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e weekly Federal Reserve release o f t h e M1 data i s an announcement o f t h e p r e l i m i n a r y estimate o f t h e change i n t h e money stock f o r t h e week ended e i g h t days t o ten days e a r l i e r . The announcement o f the change i n the money stock provides new i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e q u a n t i t y o f money. I t does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h between demand and supply shocks, nor does i t d i s t i n g u i s h between temporary and permanent shocks.
I f the weekly M1 growth s e r i e s has a d e t e r m i n i s t i c trend, then weekly v a r i a t i o n s i n M I should be t h e r e s u l t o f temporary shocks and t h e weekly announcements should provide 1 i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n about f u t u r e 1 eve1 s o f money and prices. I f so, the observed response o f asset p r i c e s t o money stock announcements may resul t from market over-reacti on. Thi s hypothesi s i s o f f e r e d by S h i l l e r , Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) . I f t h e weekly M I growth s e r i e s has a s t o c h a s t i c trend, then weekly v a r i a t i o n s i n M1 c o u l d be t h e r e s u l t o f permanent shocks, and t h e weekly announcements c o u l d c o n t a i n useful i n f o r m a t i o n about f u t u r e l e v e l s o f money and prices. I n t h i s case, t h e market r e a c t i o n i s appropriate.
We use 
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I n model 2 the s u r p r i s e i n t h e money stock announcement w i l l be a t r a n s i t o r y random e r r o r , l i k e l y t o be o f f s e t i n f u t u r e d e v i a t i o n s o f money from trend. There i s n e a r l y unanimous agreement by a l l observers t h a t weekly money s t a t i s t i c s a r e extremely e r r a t i c , and therefore, poor i n d i c a t o r s o f underlying trends. Whi 1 e monthly data can o f t e n deviate considerably from such trends, t h e weekly observations a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y "noisy." Week-to-week changes a r e q u i t e l a r g e and recent estimates indicate that the "noise" element--attributable t o the random nature of money flows and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n seasonal adjustment--accounts for plus or m i n u s $3.3 billion i n weekly change two-thirds of the time. Such a large e r r a t i c element appears i n t r i n s i c t o money behavior, rather than implying poor underlying s t a t i s t i c s .
This interpretation of the "noise" i n M I data suggests t h a t weekly M I announcements contain 1 i t t l e information about future 1 eve1 s of the money stock or prices. T h i s interpretation implies t h a t there i s a deterministic trend in the money supply. If so, the variance of forecast errors a t period t + n i s bounded for a l l n. Using both the expected and the first-published data on MI, we cannot reject the hypothesi s that the autoregressive processes generating the data contain a root equal to unity. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the weekly money stock data contain important information about future levels of MI. Of course, whether the announcements contain information about future prices depends on whether the stochastic trend is caused by non-stationarity in the nominal money supply or i n the real money demand function. An examination of t h i s issue i s provided i n the discussion be1 ow. 
SEE 0.00554 0.00377 0.0051 8 0.00425
Notes: The t -s t a t i s t i c s are shown i n parentheses. Mla i s t h e f i r s t pub1 i s h e d f i g u r e f o r MI. Mle i s the sum o f t h e previous p e r i o d Mla and
t h e change predicted by t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n Money Market Services weekly survey. The second sample p e r i o d begins i n February 1980, a f t e r t h e change i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f M I . I n no case can we r e j e c t the hypothesis t h a t f 1 = 1. The 0.05 c r i t i c a l value f o r % i s -3.43 f o r sample s i z e s o f 100.
C r i t i c a l Review o f t h e L i t e r a t u r e
Extensive research on the t o p i c o f the money supply announcements over the l a s t f i v e years has l e d t o a predominance o f f o u r main hypotheses. The f i r s t hypothesis asserts t h a t a s u r p r i s e i n the money stock announcement contains i n f o r m a t i o n about f u t u r e money supply growth. Cornel 1 ( 1 983a) c a l l s i t the expected i n f l a t i o n hypothesis, i n which a p o s i t i v e money stock s u r p r i s e w i l l be incorporated i n f u t u r e l e v e l s o f the money supply. As a r e s u l t , i n t e r e s t r a t e s r i s e t o r e f l e c t an i n f l a t i o n premium, and t h e d o l l a r depreciates a g a i n s t major f o r e i g n currencies. However, the spot exchange r a t e does n o t depreciate i n t h e pre-October 1979 p e r i o d as t h i s hypothesis p r e d i c t s . Furthermore, t h e spot value o f the d o l l a r appreciates f o l l o w i n g the money stock announcement i n t h e post-October 1979 period. Also, t h i s hypothesis does n o t e x p l a i n why long-term i n t e r e s t r a t e s and forward i n t e r e s t r a t e s r e a c t more s t r o n g l y i n t h e post-October 1979 p e r i o d than i n t h e pre-October 1979 period. To e x p l a i n t h e stronger r e a c t i o n o f long-term r a t e s i n t h e l a t e r period, advocates o f t h e expected i n f l a t i o n hypothesis have t o assume t h a t the October 6, 1979, change i n t h e operating procedure 1 ed t c a decl i ne i n t h e Federal Reserve ' s concern about i n f l a t i o n .
The secbnd hypothesis assumes t h a t money stock s u r p r i s e s c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about money demand shocks. This i s c a l l e d t h e p o l i c y a n t i c i p a t i o n hypothesis. Works by U r i c h and Wachtel (1981 ), U r i c h (1982), and Roley and Walsh (1983) 
are based on t h e assumptions t h a t p r i c e s are f i x e d and t h a t t h e
Federal Reserve uses a p a r t i a l adjustment procedure t o achieve i t s monetary stock surprise would generate anticipation of future tightening of money growth, which would raise short-term real i n t e r e s t rates via the liquidity effect and long-term real i n t e r e s t rates via the expectations theory of the term structure. The change i n real interest rates would induce international capital flows that would r e s u l t in a do1 l a r appreciation.3 The duration and strength of the policy anticipation effect would depend on how long i t takes the Federal Reserve to offset past deviations from the target and the degree of price rigidity.
This hypothesis i s not consistent w i t h the empirical evidence. The inconsistency l i e s in the reaction of the forward i n t e r e s t rates. Shiller, Campbell , and Schoenhol t z (1 983) and Hardouvel i s (1 984) have shown t h a t longer-term forward i n t e r e s t rates react strongly t o money stock announcements. The pol icy anticipation hypothesis expl ains the result only i f the liquidity effect l a s t s for several years.
The third hypothesis i s a synthesis of the f i r s t two. Hardouvel i s (1 984) and Loeys (1984) argue thax the liquidity effect dominates i n the short r u n and the inflation premium effect dominates i n the long r u n . Following a positive surprise in the money stock, short-term nominal interest rates r i s e because the market expects the Federal Reserve to o f f s e t partially the deviations above the money supply target. However, because the Federal constructed on the implicit assumption t h a t real i n t e r e s t rates are fixed.
These results cannot be used t o distinguish between the policy anticipation and the inflation premi urn hypotheses, because the inflation premium hypothesis was implicitly assumed i n the construction of the expected spot exchange rate.
There i s another drawback i n t h i s third hypothesis. Cornell ( 1 983b, p. demand growth relative to the given money supply growth. As a result, current and expected future real interest rates rise to clear the money market.
655) points out that " i t i s intuitively d i f f i c u l t t o understand
On t h e e m p i r i c a l l e v e l , the hypothesis s u f f e r s because M1 growth was strong i n 1 a t e 1981 , 1982 , and e a r l y 1983 whi 1 e r e a l a c t i v i t y was s u r p r i s i n g l y weak; y e t , t h i s was the p e r i o d when t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between money stock surprises and i n t e r e s t r a t e s was strongest. Furthermore, t h i s hypothesis cannot e x p l a i n why i n t e r e s t r a t e s respond t o money stock s u r p r i s e s i n t h e pre-October 1979 p e r i o d when t h e Federal Reserve was accommodating money demand shocks. On the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l , t h e assumption o f p r i c e r i g i d i t y i s n o t necessary t o e x p l a i n why the s u r p r i s e i n t h e money stock announcement leads t o changes i n expected r e a l i n t e r e s t rates.
Evidence from t h e Foreign Exchange Market Since t h e evidence o f the r e a c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o the money stock announcements was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between competing hypotheses,
researchers were encouraged t o 1 ook a t a cross section o f markets. Engel and Frankel (1984) use evidence from the spot market f o r exchange r a t e s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the expected i n f l a t i o n hypothesis and the pol i c y a where mt and pt = l o g s o f t h e money supply and the p r i c e l e v e l , it = short-term i n t e r e s t rate, at = i n f l u e n c e o f r e a l income and o t h e r exogenous s h i f t s i n money demand, rt = r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e , = expected variable, and * = f o r e i g n country variable. I Because Etat+j i s greater than Etat+j for every value of t, the t -pt difference i s negative; i . e . , the price level will f a l l . Note t h a t i f the exchange rate i s determined by purchasing power parity, the exchange rate equation can be written i n log form as follows:
n t i c i p a t i o n hypothesis. This subsection shows t h a t t h e assumption o f p r i c e r i g i d i t y introduced by Engel and Frankel i s n o t necessary t o e x p l a i n the
The reduction i n the domestic price level will lead t o a dollar appreciation, * given that pt remains unchanged. Similarly, i t can be shown t h a t the future price level, pt+l, will fa1 1. If the forward exchange r a t e i s an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, and i f the l a t t e r i s determined by the price level differential in period t + l , the forward exchange rate will appreciate.
Wal sh (1984) argues that the change in operating procedures in 1979 caused a change i n the parameters of the money demand function. Whether due t o the inflation policy change or the operating procedure change, there appears t o have been an increase in the i n t e r e s t e l a s t i c i t y of money demand sometime a f t e r October 1979.
If there was an increase i n 2 , the change in the price level shown in equation 11 would be larger following a surprise increase In sum, i t has been shown t h a t i f a money stock surprise signals a persistent money demand shock originating i n a portfolio disturbance and i f the Federal Reserve i s following a fixed money growth rule, the spot and forward exchange rates will appreciate. There i s no need t o assume price rigidity to obtain t h i s result.
Furthermore, s t u d i e s t h a t examine the r e a c t i o n o f spot exchange r a t e s t o money stock announcements i g n o r e t h e e f f e c t s o f f o r e i g n exchange i n t e r v e n t i o n by monetary a u t h o r i t i e s t h e day a f t e r t h e money stock announcement. To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t , assume t h a t the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s intervene based on t h e f o l 1 owing r u l es :
where It = amount o f d o l l a r i n t e r v e n t i o n by the United States the day a f t e r the announcement, S Mt = money stock surprise, and = amount o f d o l l a r i n t e r v e n t i o n by West Germany t h e day a f t e r the announcement.
Although the exchange r a t e and i n t e r v e n t i o n are interdependent, f o r t h e sake o f simp1 i c i t y we can w r i t e t h e f o l l o w i n g equation: where e = exchange r a t e on t h e day f o l l o w i n g the announcement, and t Zt = other r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s on the day f o l l o w i n g the announcement.
Equation 15 s t a t e s t h a t on t h e day f o l l o w i n g the announcement t h e exchange r a t e w i l l be determined by domestic and f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n and a l l other purchase d o l l a r s h e a v i l y t h e n e x t day--perhaps j o i n t l y w i t h the West German a u t h o r i t i e s . I f so, t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the d o l l a r was n o t caused by t h e announcement e f f e c t b u t by i n t e r v e n t i o n ; the Engel and Frankel and t h e Hardouvel i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s thus may be i n c o r r e c t .
Testing f o r t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s hypothesis i s extremely d i f f i c u l t because o f s i m u l t a n e i t y problems. 
This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e n o t i o n t h a t c e n t r a l banks
" lean against the wind" i n t h e i r i n t e r v e n t i o n pol i c y , and i t makes the Engel and Frankel f i n d i n g s mot-e c r e d i b l e . The United States has p r a c t i c a l l y ceased i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the f o r e i g n exchange markets under t h e Reagan administration.
However, the West German and o t h e r European monetary a u t h o r i t i e s have continued i n t e r v e n i n g r e g u l a r l y , which s t i l l r a i s e s some questions about t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e s u l t s from t h e spot r e a c t i o n o f the spot exchange r a t e t o money stock announcements.
F i n a l l y , researchers have ignored the i n f o r m a t i o n contained i n the changes o f t h e forward exchange rate. The advantages of examining the r e a c t i o n o f forward exchange r a t e s a r e twofold: changes i n the forward exchange r a t e s f o l l o w i n g a money stock s u r p r i s e are f r e e o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f i n t e r v e n t i o n , and the examination o f the simultaneous r e a c t i o n o f the spot and forward exchange r a t e s provides useful i n f o r m a t i o n as t o t h e nature and persistence o f a shock.
The Role of Policy Regimes and Operating Procedures
The empirical studies cited above do not distinguish clearly between the different policy regimes and the various operating procedures that may be used t o achieve the different policies. In theory, there i s l i t t l e -a priori reason to make the distinction. If a regime were defined i n terms of a pol icy objective function and a structural model, then any change i n the objective function or i n the structure, including a change i n the short-run pol icy After 1980, the actual inflation rate began t o f a l l more quickly than expected. Inflation expectations were lowered, and there was a large increase in the demand for money. In the classical model ,-a one-time 1 owering of the i n f l a t i o n r a t e r e q u i r e s a one-time d e c l i n e i n the p r i c e l e v e l --o r a compensating increase i n t h e nominal money supply--to c l e a r the market f o r r e a l balances.
I n t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e was a r a p i d d e c l i n e o f i n f l a t i o n below the r a t e t h a t was thought t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e Federal Reserve's monetary t a r g e t s , and t h e r e was a l a r g e p o s i t i v e d r i f t i n M I above t h e t a r g e t s i n both 1982 and 1983. T h i s one-time s h i f t i n t h e demand f o r r e a l balances described above i s a temporary phenomenon. Mundel 1 ( 1 963 and Tobin (1 965) argue t h a t a reduction i n t h e e q u i l i b r i u m i n f l a t i o n r a t e can a1 so r a i s e t h e t r e n d i n t h e growth r a t e o f money demand; t h i s r e s u l t s from a wealth e f f e c t . 6 A t a lower expected i n f l a t i o n r a t e , the higher demand f o r the r e a l balances w i l l l e a d t o a l e f t w a r d s h i f t i n the demand f o r r e a l savings and t o an increase i n t h e .real i n t e r e s t r a t e .

During t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e was another important f a c t o r t h a t should have l e d t o an increase i n t h e demand f o r money--the end o f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n against e x p l i c i t i n t e r e s t -r a t e payments on checkable deposits i n January 1981. This change a l s o was expected t o have b o t h temporary and permanent e f f e c t s on t h e growth o f t h e demand f o r M I . When depository i n s t i t u t i o n s were allowed t o pay i n t e r e s t on checkable accounts, t h e r e should have been a one-time s h i f t o f funds o u t o f passbook savings and o t h e r sources o f wealth i n t o M I . This l a r g e t r a n s i t o r y s h i f t o f funds was expected t o be followed by a permanent increase i n t h e growth r a t e o f the demand f o r MI, r e s u l t i n g from the permanent r e d u c t i on i n the opportunity c o s t o f h o l d i n g checkable deposits. 7
In sum, these changes c o u l
d have been expected t o increase t h e demand f o r r e a l balances. As l o n g as t h e Federal Reserve was expected t o maintain i t s d i s i n f l a t i o n objective, i t was n o t expected t o accommodate f u l l y f u t u r e increases i n money demand. Therefore, a p o s i t i v e money stock s u r p r i s e was seen as a r e l a t i v e increase i n money demand, l e a d i n g t o an increase i n t h e r e a l i n t e r e s t rate. I f t h i s hypothesis i s c o r r e c t , then i n t h e post-1979
p e r i o d we expect an increase i n both s h o r t -and long-term i n t e r e s t r a t e s and a s i g n i f i c a n t a p p r e c i a t i o n i n b o t h spot and forward exchanges f o l l o w i n g a s u r p r i s e increase i n t h e money stock.
The Operating Procedure Monetary pol i c y a c t i o n s i n f l uence market v a r i a b l e s d i r e c t l y through t h e i r e f f e c t on the reserve market and i n d i r e c t l y through t h e i r e f f e c t on expectations. We have examined t h e i n d i r e c t e f f e c t . T h i s subsection describes the d i r e c t e f f e c t by analyzing a t y p i c a l bank's use o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n the money stock announcement under a l t e r n a t i v e reserve accounting r u l e s and operating procedures. Between September 1968 and February 1984, banks were r e q u i r e d t o h o l d reserves a g a i n s t deposits on a 1 agged basis; i . e., average d a i l y reserves h e l d i n any given week were used t o meet reserve requirements c a l c u l a t e d from deposit l e v e l s o f two weeks e a r l i e r . This 1 ag was i n s t i t u t e d i n 1968 t o g i v e i n d i v i d u a l banks precise knowledge about t h e l e v e l o f t h e i r reserve requirement. The l a g a l s o gave t h e Federal Reserve time t o c o l l e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about aggregate reserve demand. I n February 1984, the Federal Reserve implemented a r e t u r n t o almost contemporaneous reserve accounting. The banking system had objected t o t h i s s w i t c h on the grounds t h a t i t would be c o s t l y t o s e t up t h e information systems necessary t o monitor deposit l e v e l s on an instantaneous basis. As a concession t o t h i s issue, t h e Federal Reserve chose a form o f CRR t h a t was n o t The new r u l e s i n c l u d e d o t h e r changes. One was a lengthening o f t h e reserve accounting p e r i o d from one week t o two weeks. Banks now p o s t reserves
averaged over two weeks ending on a Wednesday, against deposits averaged over two weeks ending on a Monday. Banks have two days t o measure transactions deposits and a d j u s t t h e i r reserve p o s i t i o n s accordingly. Only reserve requirements against t r a n s a c t i o n s deposits are contemporaneous.
There was a l s o a change i n the t i m i n g o f the weekly money stock To e x p l a i n t h e r e a c t i o n o f t h e federal funds r a t e t o t h e money stock announcement, we w i l l l o o k a t three f a c t o r s : t h e reserve accounting r u l e s , the nonborrowed reserve operating procedures, and t h e t i m i n g o f the release of i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e money stock. Under t h e federal funds r a t e t a r g e t i n g procedure and lagged reserve accounting, t h e market had q u i t e good i n f o r m a t i o n about the reserve supply function. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
s e t narrow 1 i m i t s w i t h i n which the federal funds r a t e was allowed t o f l u c t u a t e . The manager o f the open market desk a t the Federal Reserve Bank o f Mew York ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as the desk) would e n t e r t h e market t o s e l l s e c u r i t i e s i f t h e federal funds r a t e f e l l below t h e lower 1 i m i t; he would
e n t e r the market t o buy s e c u r i t i e s whenever t h e federal funds r a t e traded above the upper l i m i t . This i n t e r v e n t i o n throughout the t r a d i n g day sent an
immediate signal t o t h e market about the l i m i t s on the operating t a r g e t . The
FOMC d i r e c t e d the desk t o s e t a narrow range f o r t h e federal funds r a t e , b u t t h e range was conditioned on o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e FOMC, u s u a l l y on the growth o f t h e monetary aggregates r e l a t i v e t o short -run paths t h a t were s e t a t t h e FOMC meetings. However, changes i n the l i m i t s f o r t h e federal funds r a t e range
were small and infrequent. As a r e s u l t o f t h i s procedure, t h e market n o t o n l y knew t h e c u r r e n t target, b u t a l s o i t c o u l d f o r e c a s t short-term i n t e r e s t r a t e s several weeks i n advance w i t h small e r r o r s . The weekly money stock announcement was important i n p r e d i c t i n g t h e reserve supply f u n c t i o n o n l y i n so f a r as t h e federal funds r a t e l i m i t s were expected t o be changed i n unexpectedly large increase i n M1 was accompanied by a compensating s h i f t i n NBR so t h a t the borrowing target was maintained. On a weekly average basis t h i s procedure 1 ooked much 1 i ke the i nterest-rate operating procedure t h a t was i n effect before October 1979. One difference was t h a t any rotation of the borrowing demand curve led t o a different federal funds rate.
During the nonborrowed reserve procedure, the Federal Reserve entered the market once a day, usually between 11:30 am and noon. The operation was primarily defensive; i . e . , i t was a response t o movements i n the uncontroll able sources of reserve supply. To a 1 arge extent, that intra-week procedure was continued w i t h the borrowing target. The market participants did not know the exact amount of the borrowing target, nor d i d they know the exact 1 ocation of the borrowing function. Consequently, they could not narrow down a small range for the funds rate as they had done prior to October 1979.
The weekly averages were very stable, b u t daily v o l a t i l i t y made i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the market t o perceive changes i n the stance of policy than had been the case when the federal funds rate was the operating target.
Nevertheless, on a weekly basis, t h e borrowing t a r g e t c o u l d be described as a federal funds r a t e smoothing procedure. Because o f lagged reserve requirements, the money stock announcement s t i l l contained i n f o r m a t i o n about the aggregate demand f o r reserves. However, because o f borrowed reserve t a r g e t i n g , market p a r t i c i p a n t s expected the Federal Reserve t o accommodate an u n a n t i c i p a t e d s h i f t i n t h e demand f o r reserves by a d j u s t i n g nonborrowed reserves. Therefore, one would expect no s i g n i f i c a n t r e a c t i o n o f the federal funds r a t e t o money stock announcements.
F i n a l l y , the r e c e n t change i n the reserve settlement r u l e s has important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e e f f e c t o f money stock announcements on the federal funds r a t e . Before February 2, 1984, t h e d e v i a t i o n of t h e money stock announcement from the expected l e v e l gave the market two types o f information: t h e f i r s t was information about the aggregate q u a n t i t y o f reserves t h a t would be demanded over the n e x t few t r a d i n g days; the second was i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e p o s i t i o n o f the money stock r e l a t i v e t o the perceived p o l i c y t a r g e t . Under the hypothesis t h a t p r i c e s i n e f f i c i e n t markets aggregate information, the money stock announcements no longer i n c l u d e new i n f o r m a t i o n about aggregate reserve demand. That i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l already be apparent from t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h a t p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g the reserve settlement p e r i o d t h a t w i l l have ended before the money stock dats are released. The market w i l l a l s o have b e t t e r i n f o r m a t i o n about the money stock r e l a t i v e t o the perceived pol i c y t a r g e t .
To some e x t e n t i t w i l l be i n f e r r e d from t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n aggregate reserves.
Furthermore, banks i n s t a l l e d new i n f o m a t i o n -g a t h e r i n g systems t o meet reserve requirements on a contemporaneous basis. Many arrangements have been made by banks and p r i v a t e f i r m s t o pool deposit i n f o r m a t i o n i n a way t h a t mimics t h e process o f deposit data c o l l e c t i o n used by the Federal Reserve. These f a c t o r s suggest t h a t t h e r e w i l l n o t be a s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n between s u r p r i s e s i n t h e money stock announcements and subsequent changes i n asset prices. and a* f o r domestic i n t e r e s t r a t e s a r e r e p o r t e d i n the t o p o f t a b l e s 2 and 3.
We have f o l l o w e d t h e suggestion o f S h i l l e r , Campbell, and Schoenholtz by i n c l u d i n g t h e forward i n t e r e s t r a t e s i m p l i e d by t h e expectations theory o f the term s t r u c t u r e . We use S h i l l e r ' s (1979) duration-adjusted 1 i n e a r approximation t o c o n s t r u c t t h e i m p l i e d forward rates. Estimates o f al and a* f o r the i m p l i e d forward r a t e s a r e shown i n t h e middle o f t a b l e s 2 and 3.
I n a d d i t i o n , we examine the r e a c t i o n s o f the dollar/mark spot rate, t h e three-month dollar/mark forward r a t e , and t h e twelve-month dollar/mark forward r a t e t o money stock announcements. These r e s u l t s a r e shown i n the bottom o f t a b l e s 2 and 3.
The f u l l sample period s t a r t s on September 28, 1977, and ends on September 21, 1984. We assume t h a t there was a s w i t c h from a p o l i c y t h a t l e d t o a c c e l e r a t i n g i n f l a t i o n before October 1979 t o a pol i c y t h a t emphasized d i s i n f l a t i o n a f t e r October 1979. The e s t i m a t i o n p e r i o d i n c l udes t h r e e d i f f e r e n t operating procedures: a f e d e r a l funds r a t e operating procedure from a Indicates s i g n i f i c a n t f i rst-order autocorrel ation. These parameters were estimated using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. The t -s t a t i s t i c s a r e shown i n parentheses. The results from the pre-October 1979 period provide support for the hypothesis that the money stock announcement during t h i s period contained information about future inflation. The estimate of al was positive and significant a t a 5 percent c r i t i c a l level for a l l of the domestic interest rates except the federal funds rate. The lack of response of the federal funds rate was expected. The market anticipated t h a t the Federal Reserve would accommodate the unexpected s h i f t s in the demand f o r reserves;
consequently, the cost of obtaining reserves the remaining days of the settlement week was expected t o remain relatively unchanged. All of the imp1 ied forward rates responded positively to the money stock surprises, b u t only in the case of the three-month ahead, nine-month rate was the response significantly different from zero a t the 5 percent level.
By themselves the interest-rate results are consistent with almost any of the alternative hypotheses. Following the suggestion of Engel and Frankel, we look a t the reaction i n the spot dollar/mark exchange market. A1 though the do1 1 a r depreciated foll owing a positive money stock surprise, the response in the spot market was not s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant. The dollar also depreciated in the three-and twelve-month forward exchange markets following a positive surprise i n the money stocl: announcement. The response of the twelve-month forward exchange rate i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant a t the 5 percent level. These findings provide support f o r the inflation premium hypothesis over the policy anticipation hypothesis and for our assumption that the pre-October 1979 period can be characterized as an inflationary monetary pol icy regime.
October 1979 t o October 1982
During the period of the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure, the reactions of a l l domestic i n t e r e s t rates were much greater than before. In the e a r l i e r period, a 1 percent positive surprise i n the money stock led t o a 7-basis-point increase i n the three-month Treasury b i l l rate and a 1.5-basis-point increase i n the thirty-year Treasury bond rate. In the period of nonborrowed reserve targeting, the reactions of these rates were considerably stronger, 36 and 11.5 basis points, respectively. Furthermore, the response of the federal funds rate to money stock surprises was stronger and s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant a t the 5 percent level. Participants i n the reserve market understood that a positive surprise i n the aggregate demand for reserves w i t h i n the settlement week would lead to a higher cost of borrowing reserves for the remainder of the settlement week.
There was also a dramatic change in the response i n exchange markets. The spot and forward dollar exchange rates appreciated sharply against the mark following a positive money stock announcement. This was a sharp reversal from the e a r l i e r period. Engel and Frankel attributed t h i s reversal in the spot market t o a change in the real i n t e r e s t rate caused by expected liquidity effects. This explanation i s inconsistent with the significant reaction of the forward i n t e r e s t rates several years out and the twelve-month ahead forward exchange rates. Furthermore, i t does not explain the significant depreciation of the forward exchange rate i n the e a r l i e r period.
M e a t t r i b u t e the appreciation of the dollar and the strong upward reaction of i n t e r e s t rates subsequent to a positive money stock surprise during t h i s period t o the policy regime change. Money stock announcements provided the market with information about persistent money demand shocks that the Federal
Reserve was not expected to acco~mnodate fully. Following a positive money stock surprise, the market revised upward i t s assessment of current and future real i n t e r e s t rates, leading t o an appreciation of the spot and forward values of the do1 l a r .
October 1982 t o February 1984
The next period i s interesting, because i t allows us to t e s t whether the change in the operating procedure can be viewed as a change i n the policy regime. After October 1982, the Federal Reserve began t o target borrowed reserves. Since this i s an interest-rate smoothing procedure, the federal funds rate was not expected to respond t o the announcements. The response of the federal funds rate during t h i s period was s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignificant.
The pattern of responses of i n t e r e s t rates and exchange rates i s similar t o the one ohserved in the period of nonborrowed reserve targeting. The longest-term i n t e r e s t rates and the forward exchange rates react more strongly in this period than they d i d during the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure. This suggests to us that the strong response of asset prices, other than the federal funds rate, resulted from disinflation policy and not from the change in operating procedures. The dramatic difference between the pattern of responses under borrowed reserve targeting procedures and under the interest-rate targeting procedures suggests t h a t the operating procedure d i d not determine the policy regime for t h i s sample period.
February 1984 t o September 1984
As predicted, the money supply announcements appear t o be i r r e l e v a n t .
Estimates o f al are n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r any o f t h e assets we examined. This " surprise 1 ' we measure includes i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t has been revealed i n the c l e a r i n g o f t h e reserve market before tile rrioney stock i s 
The R a t i o n a l i t y o f the Survey Forecasts
The estimates o f ap are shown i n t a b l e 3. According t o t h e e f f i c i e n t market hypothesis, t h i s c o e f f i c i e n t should be zero. However, we f i n d t h a t the c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than zero i n many cases across a l l regimes.
W e suggest t h a t the negative s i g n r e s u l t s because t h e survey i s an i n e f f i c i e n t f o r e c a s t o f the expected change i n F11. The agents participati'ng i n the survey a r e o n l y a subset o f those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the market. The median survey o f t h e i r opinions i s l e s s e f f i c i e n t than t h e market o p i n i o n embedded i n the i n t e r e s t r a t e j u s t p r i o r t o t h e announcement. This market o p i n i o n i s a trade-weighted opinion o f a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e market.
Since t h i s i n t e r e s t r a t e enters t h e dependent v a r i a b l e w i t h a negative sign,
we g e t a negative s i g n f o r a*.
Concl usion
Our main objective i n t h i s paper i s t o explain the changing patterns of response by asset prices t o money stock announcements during several subperiods between 1977 and the present. Previous work i n t h i s area has not distinguished between policy regimes and operating procedures. Furthermore, we can now include evidence from a new operating procedure and new reserve accounting rules. W e also include information from the forward exchange market. By taking account of forward exchange rates and the institutional, procedural, and policy changes, we are able t o resolve ambiguities that remain i n published work. F i r s t , we show that the pattern of response of the federal funds rate to money stock surprises during different subperiods over the l a s t seven years depends on the Federal Reserve's operating procedure and the reserve accounting rules. Second, we show t h a t a change i n the operating procedure does not necessarily imply a change i n the monetary policy regime. In t h i s context, we show t h a t the positive response of asset prices t o money stock surprises i n the pre-October 1979 period resulted from an inflation premium.
In contrast, the response of asset prices to money stock surprises i n the post-October 1979 period resulted from a change i n the expected real i n t e r e s t rate.
release. The original source for the exchange rates is the Bank of America.
Since the H.6 release (Money Announcement) was made on various days throughout the sample period, we collected daily data. A "before-announcement n rate was taken as the l a s t available value before the announcement. The ''after-announcement 1 ' r a t e was taken as the f i r s t available value a f t e r the announcement. There i s always a t l e a s t a 24-hour span between the "before" Table Al . 
